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The Land Certification Program and Off-Farm  
Employment in Ethiopia 
Mintewab Bezabih Ayele and Eyerusalem Siba 
Abstract 
Strong property rights have long been touted as key to increased performance of the rural 
economy in developing countries. Indeed, in an overwhelmingly agrarian economy like Ethiopia, with 
state ownership of land, increased land tenure security of individual farmers is expected to play a 
significant role in factor allocation within and beyond the agricultural sector. This paper analyses the 
impact of a land certification program on farmers’ off-farm participation, based on household-level 
panel data collected in the Amhara Region of Ethiopia. Identification of the program’s impact relies on 
the sequential nature of its implementation and application of the Difference-in-Differences strategy. 
Our results suggest that certification is a significant determinant of participation in major off-farm 
employment activities. The program’s effect is not shown to depend on size of landholdings. 
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The Land Certification Program and Off-Farm  
Employment in Ethiopia 
Mintewab Bezabih Ayele and Eyerusalem Siba 
1. Introduction 
Small-scale agriculture is a major employer in many poor countries. Ethiopia is 
no exception. The heavy dependence on small-holder and low-productivity agriculture 
makes a large share of the population vulnerable to weather and production-related 
shocks. Land certification has been one strategy to increase productivity. In addition, 
diversification of livelihood, particularly toward off-farm activities, has been suggested 
as a means of reducing vulnerability, as well as transforming the overall economy (Ellis 
2000; Barrett et al. 2001; Lanjouw and Lanjouw 2001). This paper evaluates the extent to 
which a land certification program in Ethiopia impacts participation in off-farm 
employment of rural households in the central highlands of Ethiopia. Knowing this would 
inform policymakers concerning the welfare gains from land right reform programs as a 
result of efficient allocation of land and labor resources to more productive use, and 
could reduce private efforts to guard land rights as well as improve the general 
effectiveness in promoting structural transformation and improved land rights. 
Participation in off-farm activities may be driven by both push and pull factors. 
Households may be pushed into alternative livelihoods due to food insecurity, for 
example, or pulled into such activities due to demand from other sectors.1 A household’s 
ability and need to engage in off-farm activities thus depends to a large extent on its 
endowment of labor, land and other productive resources (Woldehana and Oskam 2001; 
Holden et al. 2004; Shi et al. 2007). Farmers’ ability to participate in off-farm 
                                                 
 Mintewab Bezabih Ayele, London School of Economics, email: mintewab.bezabih@port.ac.uk. 
Eyerusalem Siba, Brookings Institute. 
1 In settings where farming is associated with low profits and high risk, “distress-push” diversification may 
motivate off-farm participation. In such instances, the non-farm sector serves as insurance against 
diminishing returns to assets and as risk management in the agricultural sector (Barrett et al. 2001; Block 
and Webb 2001; Rijkers and Söderbom 2013). Diversification due to “demand-pull” factors, on the other 
hand, is often motivated by seasonal and interpersonal aggregation of household income and consumption, 
as well as economies of scope in livelihood diversification (Davis 2003). In addition, participation in off-
farm employment may depend on the ability to participate, e.g., human and physical capital endowments 
(Woldehana and Oskam 2001; Van den Berg and Kumbi 2006; Bezu and Barrett 2012). 
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employment may also be determined by the level of tenure security, because in settings 
where the land ownership system is characterized by tenure insecurity, leaving the farm 
may be associated with a risk of losing the land (Do and Iyer 2008; Deininger et al. 2008; 
Field 2007; Jin and Deininger 2009; De Janvry et al. 2015; Deininger et al. 2015). 
Ethiopia’s current land tenure system makes for an ideal case to study the effect 
of improved tenure security on off-farm participation, for two main reasons. First and 
foremost, the land rights for Ethiopia’s farming masses have been associated with 
inherent tenure insecurity, partly caused by the fact that farmers hold only usufruct rights 
to land and all land is formally owned by the state (Crewett et al. 2008). Second, the 
country has recently implemented a land certification program aimed at reducing tenure 
insecurity resulting from the system of usufruct land rights. 
Accordingly, the central hypothesis of this paper is that land certification 
enhances tenure security, which in turn enhances participation in off-farm employment. 
Tenure security may affect incentives to engage in off-farm activities, both directly and 
indirectly. The direct effect consists mainly of a reduction in the expected cost of being 
away from the land (i.e., a reduction in the risk of land loss through redistribution).
2
 The 
indirect effects operate via farm-level intensification, such as investments in soil 
conservation (Holden et al. 2009; Deininger et al. 2011; Goldstein et al. 2015) and 
increased use of external inputs (Holden and Yohannes 2002) and land consolidation (De 
Janvry et al. 2015). While the direct effect is expected to be positive, farm-level 
intensification may affect off-farm participation both positively and negatively. On the 
one hand, farming intensification may lead to an increased need for labor on the farm, 
and this naturally reduces the amount of labor available to engage in off-farm activities 
(either due to own-farm intensification or due to land consolidation by other farmers). For 
instance, Deininger et al. (2015) find that land rental markets transfer land to land-poor, 
labor-rich and more productive producers in six Sub-Saharan African countries. If 
investment in the farm increases efficiency, on the other hand, this may free up labor for 
participation in off-farm employment. 
                                                 
2
 If off-farm activities are interpreted as a signal of excess landholdings by the government, and if the 
government has the right to redistribute land, farmers may avoid productive off-farm activities. If land 
certification reduces the insecurity related to being away from the farm, we thus may expect an increase in 
productive off-farm engagements, as individuals would no longer be constrained by the repercussions of 
tenure insecurity. 
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Our study is closely related to a few previous studies investigating the association 
between tenure security and non-farm employment (Jin and Deininger 2009; Zhang et al. 
2004; Deininger et al. 2012 on China; Deininger et al. 2008 on India; and Do and Iyer 
2008 on Vietnam).3 Using a household panel dataset, Jin and Deininger (2009) 
investigate the contribution of a land rental market to occupational diversification, where 
the likelihood of renting out land is associated with income diversification and migration 
in China. The positive relationship between off-farm employment opportunities and the 
likelihood of renting out land is also found in Zhang et al. (2004). Exploiting cross-state 
variation in land rental restrictions, using a household panel dataset, Deininger et al. 
(2008) find that the land rental market is more active in locations with high levels of non-
farm activities in India.
4
 
Unlike the above studies, our study is primarily interested in non-farm 
employment as an outcome variable and employs a measure of tenure security that is 
more general than increased rental markets, which is only one of the many outcomes of 
land certification programs.  
The study most closely related to ours is by Do and Iyer (2008) and De Janvry et 
al. (2015), who investigate the impact of a land certification program using the DiD 
approach. As in our study, their identification strategy relies on the non-uniform timing 
of the land certification program across these countries. While Do and Iyer (2008) find an 
increase in the time spent on non-farm activities and in the proportion of cultivated area 
devoted to multi-year crops (i.e., their measure of long-term agricultural investment) in 
Vietnam, De Janvry et al. (2015) find increased likelihood that households will have a 
migrant member, despite no change in total cultivated land area due to land 
consolidation, in rural Mexico. Both of these results support the hypothesis that land 
tenure security facilitates efficient allocation of land and labor resources to their efficient 
use. Our study adds to the literature because the role of tenure security for off-farm 
employment participation is largely overlooked in the African literature. While Do and 
Iyer (2008) estimate extensive margins, using the share of non-farm labor in total 
                                                 
3 Similarly, Field (2007) show that land titles increased labor supply in urban Peru as a result of reduced 
need for guard labor. Moreover, De Janvry et al (2015) find that land certification program in Mexico 
during the period 1993-2006 led to increased migration (reportedly for work reasons) from rural areas. 
4
 Lohmar (1999) also found that tenure insecurity, as measured by percentage of households with land 
changes due to village-wide relocation, is negatively associated with the probability of participation in off-
farm activities. 
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household labor, our results estimate intensive margins, using the information whether or 
not a household has any member participating in paid off-farm activities. 
In this empirical study, we use survey data obtained from the Amhara National 
Regional State of Ethiopia, containing information on household-level off-farm 
employment participation, to estimate the effect of the land certification program on off-
farm participation. We further analyze the heterogeneity of the treatment effect by farm 
size and availability of adult labor. The empirical strategy follows the Differences-in-
Differences method widely employed in impact assessment studies and exploits the 
gradual implementation of the certification program. Our results indicate that off-farm 
activities are positively responsive to land certification, with around an 80 percent chance 
of increasing off-farm participation. In addition, the program’s effect on participation is 
found not to be heterogeneous across land holders of varying size.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background 
information on the development of land tenure policies and the certification program in 
Ethiopia. Section 3 provides information on the datasets used for the analysis and 
discusses descriptive evidence. Section 4 provides a methodological discussion on the 
estimation strategy and presents the econometric models used. Baseline results together 
with their robustness checks are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes and 
discusses policy implications of the study. 
2. The Land Tenure System in Ethiopia and the Land Certification Program: 
Background 
2.1. Evolution of Land Tenure Policies in Ethiopia 
Under the feudalistic system characterizing Ethiopia’s political and economic 
landscape until 1975, the elite held all land and farmers’ tenure security hinged upon the 
quality of tenant-landlord relations. The feudalistic system was ended and replaced by a 
socialist state (Derg) in 1975 with the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie. Under the 
Derg, all land was nationalized and redistributed to farmers via peasant associations.
5
 
Eligibility and access to land was contingent on a physical presence on the land. Land 
rights were defined on a usufruct basis with no transfer rights to sell, lease, mortgage or 
                                                 
5 Peasant associations were local-level administrative organs mandated to handle land-related matters 
during the Derg regime. 
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sharecrop.
6
 Due to increasing population pressure, government land redistribution was 
frequently implemented, and the maximum landholding per family was set at ten 
hectares. Taken together, the system was characterized by a very high level of tenure 
insecurity, including a ban on land rental activities that is believed to have effectively 
prevented any migration or pursuit of alternative livelihoods for rural landholders 
(Kebede 2002; Adenew and Abdi 2005). 
In 1991, the Derg was overthrown and replaced by the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The 1995 constitution introduced a few 
improvements in tenure security, e.g., a requirement that a farmer exposed to 
expropriation have the right to compensation for any investments made on the land and 
an extension of the time farmers were allowed to lease out land. However, the new 
government, to a large extent, maintained the land policy of the Derg: land was defined 
as public property, which farmers were forbidden to sell or to use for other means of 
exchange, and farmers were required to leave the land if it was needed for public 
purposes. As a consequence, the 1995 constitution is believed to have only partially 
resolved the tenure insecurity problems of rural land holders (Adenew and Abdi 2005). 
In an effort to enhance tenure security and improve utilization of land, further 
steps were taken by the federal and regional governments of Ethiopia. In particular, the 
Rural Land Administration and Use Proclamation was drafted in 1997 (and revised in 
2005 by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development) to give farmers who hold 
title certificates the right to pass land rights on to their family members, to lease out plots 
to other farmers and investors based on the land administration rules without being 
displaced, and to use land as collateral (Adenew and Abdi 2005). In 2002, the regional 
states received greater legislative powers, enabling them to form their own land-related 
policies, and new regional structures for land administration (such as the Environmental 
Protection Land Use and Administration Authority, EPLUA) were established. The main 
objectives of the certification program were to improve tenure security through land 
registration and titling, to promote better land management and investment, and to reduce 
conflicts among farmers over land boundaries and user rights. 
                                                 
6 Transfer via inheritance was allowed, but only to immediate family members and only if permission from 
the peasant association had been acquired. 
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2.2. The Land Certification Program in Ethiopia 
The Ethiopian land certification program commenced in the Amhara region in 
2003/2004. The program is a variant of the land legislation programs that many African 
countries have been implementing since the 1990s to remedy some of the perceived 
shortcomings of existing systems. It differs from traditional land reform programs in 
terms of the relatively low cost of implementation and the participatory nature of the 
program. By 2007, over 5 million farm households are believed to have received 
certificates to their land holdings in four regions of Ethiopia (Deininger et al. 2011; 
Adenew and Abdi 2005).7 The cost has been estimated to be about 1 USD per farm plot 
or 3.5 USD per household (Deininger et al. 2008). Given that conventional titling cost up 
to about 150 USD per household in Madagascar (Jacoby and Minten 2007), the Ethiopian 
program indeed can be argued to be low-cost.  
The implementation of the program is conducted through Land Administration 
Committees (LACs) at the woreda
8
 level in five distinct steps. First, an awareness-raising 
meeting regarding the purpose and organization of land registration and certification is 
conducted between the woreda and kebele administration and farmers. In the second step, 
Land Administration and Use Committees (LACs) are elected and trained. During the 
third step, individual households’ plots are identified and demarcated jointly by LAC 
members, the designated household and households with neighboring fields. In the fourth 
step, the registration information is entered on forms and any outstanding conflict is 
passed to courts; the result of the land adjudication is then presented to the public for a 
month-long verification in order to allow for corrections. In the final step, the book of 
holdings is registered. The legal status of the holding is registered by the woreda’s 
EPLAUA head, together with the LAC chairperson. Certified households are provided 
with a document which typically includes the names and photographs of the household 
head and spouse, the size and location of the land holding, and the neighbors of the 
demarcated land of the household (Adenew and Abdi 2005; Olsson and Magnérus 2007; 
Palm 2010). 
The certificates provide farmers with written user rights to demarcated pieces of 
land. Essentially, the certificates provide titling short of full-fledged ownership. As 
                                                 
7 Tigray, Oromia and SNNP are the other regions covered by the certification program.  
8 The kebele is the smallest administrative unit in Ethiopia, while the woreda is the next largest, formed of 
a collection of kebeles. 
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indicated by Holden et al. (2011) and Bezabih et al. (2016), the certification significantly 
increased land rental activities. In an ongoing study, Bezabih et al. (2016) also show that 
certification has the effect of increasing internal migration. Transferability of land across 
families remains unaffected, as in the previous regimes land bequeathing and dividing up 
of land among family members was practiced. While the certification allows long-term 
leasing of up to 25 years, there is no provision for sale, and the inability to transform land 
to a liquid asset reduces its usefulness as collateral. 
Previous impact evaluation studies of the certification program indicate that the 
program has boosted farmers’ perceptions of tenure security and has improved land rental 
market participation of female-headed farm households (Bezabih et al. 2016). The 
program’s impact has been assessed in relation to agricultural productivity (Holden et al. 
2009; Deininger et al. 2011; Bezabih et al. 2016) and land-related investments such as 
soil and water conservation (Holden et al. 2009; Deininger et al. 2011). However, to our 
knowledge, no study has previously analyzed the extent to which the land certification 
program has affected rural households’ participation in off-farm activities. 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
To implement the analysis, we use panel data constructed from rural household 
surveys, collected during the 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2007 cropping seasons.
9
 The 
surveyed households are located in two zones (South Wollo and East Gojjam) of the 
Amhara National Regional State, a region that encompasses part of the northern and 
central highlands of Ethiopia. The choice of the two zones is intended to reflect the agro-
ecological diversity within the region, with East Gojjam having high agricultural 
potential and less rugged topography, and enjoying a more reliable rainfall pattern, than 
South Wollo.  
The rural household survey was designed independently of the implementation of 
the certification program, and therefore includes households that were covered by the 
certification program and those that were not. The last round of the survey, conducted in 
                                                 
9 This multi-year survey was conducted by the Ethiopian Development Research Institute and Addis Ababa 
University, in collaboration with the University of Gothenburg, and with financial support from the 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) since 2000. In addition to these 
institutional bodies, the last survey round in 2007 was conducted in collaboration with the World Bank. 
Futhermore, the last two rounds of the survey include two more kebeles from each of the two zones. 
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2007, was designed to gather information on the features of the certification program that 
enable analysis of the impact of the program on different variables of interest. 
By the time the fourth round was conducted in 2007, all of the kebeles had 
completed the registration process and, with the exception of a few kebeles, most 
households had received the certificate. We start the analysis using the 2000 survey round 
as our baseline. As a robustness check, we also use 2005 as a baseline and restrict the 
sample to include only the last two rounds, though there are shortcomings to using the 
2005 round as a baseline survey.10 
The sample consists of a panel of 1500 households (for 2000 and 2002 survey 
rounds) randomly selected in 12 kebeles and 1740 households (for the 2005 and 2007 
survey rounds), with two more kebeles.11 The survey contains detailed information on 
off-farm employment participation and socioeconomic and physical farm characteristics, 
as well as land certification. The construction of the certification, off-farm employment 
and other explanatory variables are discussed below. 
3.1. The Certification Variable 
The certification program is characterized by a gradual rollout, where certification 
in each kebele occurs in a rapid campaign style. The gradual rollout implementation was 
adopted because the initial plan of simultaneously reaching all woredas (and kebeles) 
within the region could not be realized.
12
 Our measure of certification is defined at a 
kebele level, where a household is considered “certified” if that particular household 
belongs to a certified kebele. A given kebele is considered certified if the initial 
                                                 
10 As the implementation of the land certification program had already started in some of the study kebeles 
by 2005 (Deininger et al. 2011), the choice of 2005 as a baseline may, thus, lead to attenuation bias as the 
program had already started to take effect. Alternatively, it could upward bias the results if early adopters 
were negatively impacted. This can happen due to the time lag between land registration and distribution of 
certificates (Deininger et al. 2011). 
11 A total of 5013 observations were employed in the analysis after accounting for missing observations 
and observations corresponding to measurement errors corresponding to some variables, which had to be 
dropped.  
12 This is reported to be due to shortages in financial and manpower resources to reach all kebeles and 
woredas simultaneously. Hence, instead of simultaneous reach-out, it was decided that kebeles and woredas 
would be reached sequentially. Informal conversations held with EPLUA officials, the body responsible for 
the implementation of the program, confirmed that the sequential implementation was done on a random 
basis. Moreover, because the kebeles included in the survey were randomly selected within each zone, the 
kebeles certified earlier belong in the same random group as those certified later. 
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demarcation of fields in the kebele by the land administration committee was completed 
at least 12 months before the last round of the survey in 2007 (Deininger et al. 2011). The 
essence of this is to ensure that sufficient time has elapsed for the effects of the program 
to be realised. As the issuance of the certificates in many cases takes 15 months to two 
years starting from the time the program was introduced (Deininger et al., 2011), having 
a cut-off of 12 months is actually a much longer period than that if the initiation period 
were accounted for. As a results, the estimates would represent the lower bounds of the 
program impact.  
3.2. Participation in Off-Farm Activities 
Participation in off-farm activities is a binary variable, which represents the 
outcome of participation in any off-farm employment activity. The variable takes the 
value of one if any members of the household engage in any off-farm activity, and the 
value zero if there was no participation in any such activity.13 To dig deeper into the 
nature of off-farm employment, activities are grouped into six categories. The first two 
categories include farm worker (paid agricultural activities on other people’s farms) and 
free worker (labor-sharing arrangements where people contribute labor freely but also 
expect the favor back in terms of labor contribution). The third category, professional 
work (skilled), includes teaching, mechanics, driving, clerical jobs, administrative work, 
health work, building and crafts making. In the fourth category, unskilled off-farm 
activity includes household help, shop keeping, security guard, and other miscellaneous 
activities. The fifth category is food-for-work – a program where participants are 
involved in public infrastructural development such as building conservation structures, 
dry-weather roads, or tree planting, and are paid in kind. Food-for-work is widely 
practiced in the more food-insecure zone of South Wollo. Further, because it is a targeted 
intervention, only the poorest of households are likely to participate in it. The ‘other’ 
miscellaneous categories are also not associated with actual payment but are usually non-
                                                 
13 The share of off-farm income in household income could serve as an alternative measure of off-farm 
participation, allowing for estimation of extensive margins. However, household income from all sources is 
not consistently reported in all the four rounds of our dataset (i.e., income is reported in cash in some cases 
and in kind in other cases) and income from some sources (remittances) are missing for some rounds. For 
these reasons, we do not use share of income from off-farm activities as a dependent variable.  
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agricultural jobs (e.g., priesthood).For our purpose, however, we exclude all unpaid off-
farm activities such as labor sharing arrangements (Free worker).14 
Table 1 presents the distribution of individuals across different off-farm activities 
for the pooled, treatment and control categories, based on observations in the years 2000, 
2002, 2005 and 2007. As Table 1 shows, around 20 percent of the households had a 
household member engaged in off-farm activities in the major off-farm categories which 
we refer to as paid off-farm employment. The mean difference results show that 
engagement in traditional labor sharing and food-for-work activities is significantly 
higher for the treatment groups. For all the other off-farm employment types, there is no 
significant difference between the treatment and control groups of households. 
Around 49 percent of the households participate in traditional labor sharing 
activities, while 12 percent are in food-for work activities and 11 percent belong in the 
unskilled work category. The rest, skilled work, paid agricultural work, and other work, 
account for 4 percent, 2 percent, and 1 percent, of off-farm employment, and can be 
considered as minor categories. The difference between control and treatment villages is 
significant in traditional labor sharing, unskilled work and food for work categories. 
3.3. Other Control Variables 
The relevant summary statistics for our control variables are presented in Table 2. 
The first panel of the table contains summary statistics for the pooled sample, while the 
second and third panels depict statistics for certified and non-certified villages, 
respectively. The statistics presented are for the baseline year (2000).  
As can be seen in Table 2, the average age of the household head in the sample is 
about 32. 13 percent of the surveyed households have a female head of household. The 
share of female-headed households is slightly higher in treated villages (16 percent) 
compared to non-treated villages (14 percent). About half of the households have an 
illiterate household head (53 percent and 54 percent in certified and non-certified 
villages, respectively). Households have, on average, two females and two males of 
working age (above 15 years) and 4.6 livestock (tropical livestock units).  
                                                 
14 However, we include food-for-work in the analysis because the Productive Safety Net Programme 
(which has now replaced food for work in Ethiopia) is shown to contribute to welfare increases for some 
households (Andersson et al. 2011; Berhane et al. 2014). 
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Because physical farm characteristics may influence labor demand on the farm, 
we also include variables related to soil and land. As can be seen in Table 2, the average 
land holding per household is 1.2 hectares. On average, the share of fertile plots is about 
0.31, and the share of plots with fertile soil is slightly and significantly higher for 
certified households than for non-certified households. However, there is no significant 
difference in the size of the farm between certified and non-certified households. 
4. Empirical Strategy 
In order to estimate the effect of the certification program on engagement in off-
farm activities, we employ the Differences-in-Differences (DiD) method. The DiD 
method is suitable for identifying the effects of a random program intervention when 
there is information on the variables of interest before and after the introduction of the 
program.
15
 Such a program typically targets a certain group of individuals (treated 
group), while the remaining group of individuals (control group) is not exposed to the 
program (Wooldridge 2002). In our case, the approach measures the impact of the land 
certification program by comparing the change in off-farm participation and off-farm 
activity choice of households in certified kebeles (treatment group) with the 
corresponding change for households in non-certified kebeles (control group). 
The hypothesized relationship between certification and participation in off-farm 
employment is represented by Equation (1).  
Pr⁡(𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝛼𝑜 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (1) 
where⁡𝑅𝑖𝑡is a dummy variable identifying the respondent household i’s off-farm 
participation status at time t. 𝑃𝑖is a dummy variable identifying whether or not the 
respondent household is located in a treated kebele. 𝑇𝑡 represents a time dummy equal to 
one for the post-program period and zero otherwise. The coefficient of the interaction 
variable⁡𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑡, referred to as the post-treatment variable in subsequent sections and the 
results tables, thus captures the impact of certification. Finally, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of other 
control variables, including socioeconomic and physical farm characteristics, that have 
                                                 
15 Other recent identification strategies used include randomized allocation of land titles in Benin to 
estimate impacts on long-term investments (Goldstein et al. 2015) and a randomized field experiment of 
land tenure formalization in Tanzania to estimate residents’ willingnes to pay for land titles. 
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potential effects on off-farm participation; 𝛼𝑖⁡represents time-invariant household-specific 
characteristics; and 𝜀𝑖𝑡⁡denotes the error term. 
The parameters of interest in Equation (1) are⁡α1, α2⁡and⁡α3. ⁡α1represents pre-
existing differences in off-farm participation between the treated and control groups in 
the baseline year, while 𝛼2 represents the change in off-farm participation in the control 
and treatment villages between the baseline year and 2007. Our major parameter of 
interest is 𝛼3, which captures by how much the likelihood of off-farm participation 
changed in the treated villages, as compared to the control group.  
We expand Equation (1) to incorporate the potential impact of farm size. The role 
of farm size is represented by a variable that measures a household’s total landholdings 
and the interaction of farm size with the post-certification variable, denoted by 𝐹𝑖𝑡⁡and 
𝑃𝑖𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑡, respectively. In Equation (2), the direct effect of farm size on off-farm 
participation is captured by 𝛼4, whereas 𝛼5⁡ ≠ 0 captures the heterogeneous impact of the 
certification among holders of various sized farms due to the association between tenure 
security and farm size.  
Pr⁡(𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝛼𝑜 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑃𝑖𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
 (2)  
The choice of panel data estimator determines how we account for unobserved 
household-specific time-invariant characteristics, represented by 𝛼𝑖. While the fixed 
effect estimator enables removal of the unobserved household-specific effect through 
data transformation, the binary nature of our dependent variable leads to a serious loss of 
observations. As a result, we follow Mundlak’s (1978) approach of incorporating the 
relationship between the time-varying regressors 𝑘𝑖𝑡 and the household fixed effect ( ). 
This approach allows for controlling for unobserved heterogeneity by adding the means 
of time-varying covariates, also known as the pseudo-fixed effects or the Mundlak-
Chamberlain’s Random Effects Model. In particular,  can be approximated by a linear 
function: 
𝛼𝑖 = 𝑎?̅?𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡⁡, 𝜂𝑖𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎𝜂
2⁡)⁡ (2a) 
Substituting expression (2a) in Equation (2) gives the estimable Equation (3): 
Pr⁡(𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝛼𝑜 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑃𝑖𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎𝑧?̅? +
𝜓𝑖𝑡  (3) 
i
i
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4.1. Randomness of Treatment and Control Kebeles and the Common 
Trend Assumption 
The proper identification of the program impacts using the DiD estimator relies 
on the randomized choice of treatment and control kebeles. In our case, if the choice of 
kebeles certified early in the process is systematically related to factors that may affect 
our outcome variable, the measurement of the treatment impact may be biased. In order 
to evaluate the degree of randomness in implementation, we examined the criteria behind 
the choices. To establish whether the sampling of treated and control kebeles in the 
survey was random, a simple test was conducted in terms of the difference in the location 
of kebeles relative to the main road/nearest town. These variables could serve as a 
measure of remoteness, representing access to information, technology, and markets. 
Accordingly, the average distance of the nearby town from the treatment and control 
kebeles is calculated to be 69.5 and 72.5 minutes, respectively, as per our survey data.
16
 
The average distance from a nearby main road is also about 24 and 37 minutes for the 
treatment and control kebeles, respectively. These figures provide no indication that the 
treatment and control kebeles differ significantly in terms of access to information, 
technology and markets. 
The validity of the DiD approach also relies on the assumption of a parallel trend 
in certified and non-certified kebeles, which could be invalidated by the presence of 
unobservable time-variant differences. For this, we employ common-trend assumption 
analysis. The common trend assumption asserts that, in the absence of the treatment, one 
would expect parallel movement between the treatment and control groups, essentially 
attributing the effect of changes in the treatment group to the program only.
17
An ideal test 
for this parallel movement would be to assess whether, in the absence of the program, the 
trends in the two groups would have been identical. However, this is unobservable, 
implying that the common trend assumption is fundamentally untestable after the 
                                                 
16 It should be noted that proximity to roads is a mere indicator of a set of confounding factors that affect 
the decision to participate in off-farm employment. As we discuss below, the test for the common trend 
assumption is a more formal way of assessing the randomness in the choice of the treatment and control 
kebeles. It should also be noted that, given modern telecommunication technology, e.g., internet, social 
media etc., one may question the role of physical distance, especially in access to information. However, 
modern communication coverage remains minimal and even those “traditional” types of modern 
communication such as telephone access remain road-side based. 
17 Violation of the common trend assumption implies that the effect of certification may not be identified 
because there are underlying factors that cause the variable of interest to respond differently in the control 
and treatment villages. 
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introduction of the program. As an alternative, it is possible to test whether there were 
common trends in the treatment and control villages in the period before the introduction 
of the program. To this effect, we used two methods: comparing the average outcomes 
after controlling for a range of explanatory variables, and testing for “placebo” effects. 
In order to do so, Equation (3) is estimated with different intercept terms for each 
year and for each treatment category, using data for periods prior to the commencement 
of the certification program. The presence of parallel trends is supported by the absence 
of differences in the intercept terms between control and treatment villages over all the 
periods. The results for the common trend assumption test are presented in Section 5.2. 
5. Results 
In this section, we present the results of our empirical analysis. We start by 
discussing the results of the decision to participate in off-farm activities, where the 2000 
round is used as a baseline, followed by our findings for the analysis using 2005 as a base 
year, as a robustness check. The final subsection presents the results of the common trend 
analysis. 
5.1. Off-Farm Employment Participation—Main Results 
Table 3 presents the results from the analysis of the off-farm participation 
equation. We start our analysis by presenting conditional logit estimates of participation 
in off-farm employment in the first panel of the table (Columns 1 and 2). In the second 
panel, Columns 3-6, we introduce the Mundlak-Chamberlain’s Random Effects Model.18 
We find that certified households (measured by residing in the treated village and 
interacted with the period after the introduction of the certification program) are more 
likely to participate in off-farm employment. The coefficient of certification conditional 
on farm size, although negative, is not significant (Column 2). Concerning the rest of the 
covariates, we find that, although there is an increasing trend in participation over time, 
female-headed households are less likely to participate in the off-farm sector, whereas 
younger household heads are more likely to participate in off-farm activities. While total 
land size does not matter for participation, the share of plots with fertile soil is found to 
                                                 
18 Because we are running a correlated random effects logit (in Columns 3-6), marginal effects are not 
valid (because they assume that the individual effect is zero). Consequently, Table 3 displays coefficient 
estimates in all specifications. 
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increase the likelihood of participating in the off-farm sector. The availability of adult 
labor is also a significant and positive predictor of participation in off-farm employment. 
Of all the control variables, households’ livestock assets and number of male adults have 
inconsistent impacts across estimations: significant impact in the random effects 
estimation and insignificant impact in the Mundlak’s fixed-effects estimations.19 
5.2. Robustness Checks—Common Trend Analysis 
To test for any statistical difference in the trend between certification and non-
certification households and kebeles, we perform a test of “placebo effects”, which 
enables us to examine whether there appear to be placebo treatment effects amongst 
households in the treated villages before the program was introduced. We do this by 
limiting the sample to the pre-certification information in the survey years 2000, 2002 
and 2005. In each regression, we use a full set of control variables, kebele fixed effects 
and Chamberlain-Mundlak effects.20 The presence of a parallel trend would be indicated 
by the lack of a significant difference in the estimated coefficient of placebo treatments 
for the above three years. The presence of a significant difference would be an indication 
of the violation of the common trend assumption.  
The results of the placebo effect analysis are presented in Table 4. As can be seen 
in Table 4, we do not find significant differences in the placebo coefficients, for all the 
years, except 2002-2005, which is weakly significant. The results therefore indicate that, 
overall, these results are supportive of the common trend assumption, and hence, validate 
causal interpretation of the results. Using the same data as Deininger et al. (2011), 
Bezabih et al. (2016) also find that the common trend assumption is largely not violated.  
6. Conclusions 
Given the pivotal importance of the land tenure system in rural economic 
dynamics, the land legislation programs implemented in many African countries since the 
1990s have received due attention in the literature. Specifically, there have been 
considerable efforts to analyze the effects of such programs on agricultural productivity, 
                                                 
19 The appendix shows the results from estimations using 2005 as the control year and the results are fairly 
similar to those in Table 3.  
20 Results of the common trends regressions are presented in the appendix. 
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land market participation and investment across Africa (e.g., Pinckney and Kimuyu 1994; 
Jacoby and Minten 2007; Ali et al. 2011).  
The Ethiopian Land Certification Program has spurred a considerable amount of 
research, in particular on the impact of the program on agricultural investment and 
productivity (e.g., Deininger et al. 2011; Holden et al. 2011, 2012; Bezabih et al. 2016). 
However, to our knowledge, this is the first paper that assesses the effect of the program 
on off-farm participation. More specifically, we estimated the effect of the land 
certification program on participation in off-farm employment, using data from the 
Central Highlands of Ethiopia. We base our hypothesis on the positive link that has been 
shown between the land certification program and tenure security (Deininger et al. 2011). 
Given that tenure insecurity induces aversion toward leaving the land in pursuit of 
employment activities outside the farm, promoting tenure security could, in many 
situations, be expected to have positive off-farm employment consequences. 
The empirical results emanating from the panel logit off-farm participation model 
suggest land certification has a positive impact on the tendency to engage in off-farm 
work. These results remain robust across different specifications and cut-off years for the 
implementation of the program. The results, however, provide little support for the 
presence of heterogeneous effects of the certification program depending on farm size.  
While the paper is the only study to assess the impact of the program on activities 
outside of agriculture, there is a need to take further strides to fully understand the role of 
such institutions in influencing the generation of dynamic off-farm activities as a pool 
factor. Specifically, in the face of the critical role that institutional structures play in 
transforming agricultural landscapes and overall economic development, an obvious 
research next step is to characterize, both theoretically and empirically, the nature of non-
farm activity generation and its interactions with institutional reforms, such that the 
conditions for positive and negative interactions are clearly understood.  
As discussed in various sections, the lack of variation in off-farm participation 
patterns across years has limited our ability to use various estimators and necessary 
corrections for the estimated coefficients. Another shortcoming is the fact that we do not 
use off-farm income shares or extensive analysis of off-farm activity choice in our 
analysis, as opposed to just participation in off-farm employment, all due to data 
limitations. As Ethiopia is a country with low mobility and very weak off-farm sectors, 
such lack of variation is expected. Further, the fact that our sampling only covers two 
zones in one region also contributes to the lack of heterogeneity. Future studies which 
rely on longer panels and larger spatial coverage will increase flexibility in the use of 
data-intensive estimators and flexible use of variables.  
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Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics—Off-Farm Participation for All the Survey Rounds 
                  
 
Pooled 
 
Control 
 
Treatment 
     Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev Mean  Std.dev Diff p-value 
Paid off-farm 0.200 0.400 0.213 0.006 0.175 0.008 -0.175 0.038 
Individual activities                 
Agricultural work (paid) 0.020 0.140 0.018 0.133 0.021 0.142 -0.003 0.694 
Traditional labor sharing (free) 0.494 0.500 0.320 0.467 0.546 0.498 -0.226 0.000 
Skilled work 0.040 0.196 0.036 0.186 0.041 0.199 -0.005 0.574 
Unskilled work 0.111 0.314 0.153 0.360 0.099 0.299 0.054 0.000 
Food for work 0.116 0.320 0.016 0.126 0.145 0.352 -0.129 0.000 
Other work 0.012 0.110 0.014 0.119 0.012 0.107 0.003 0.606 
N 5169   3359   1810       
Note: Paid off-farm represents participation in off-farm activities, including all off-farm activities reported in the survey and listed in the individual activities 
categories, other than traditional labor sharing.   
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Explanatory Variables Used in the Regressions for the Baseline Years (year=2000) 
 
Pooled 
 
Control 
 
Treatment 
     Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev Mean  Std.dev Diff p-value 
Household characteristics                  
Age of head of household 31.58 17.68 31.47 17.75 31.92 17.50 -0.447 0.7154 
Female head of household 0.151 0.335 0.147 0.301 0.161 0.344 -0.0132 0.5945 
N male adults in household 1.561 0.541 1.602 0.973 1.428 0.891 0.173 0.007 
N female adults in household 1.424 0.726 1.435 0.747 1.388 0.655 0.0475 0.3460 
Household head is illiterate 0.535 0.499 0.533 0.499 0.507 0.501 0.0266 0.4530 
N livestock owned by household 4.651 3.580 4.762 4.313 5.172 5.171 -0.409 0.1939 
         
Land characteristics                  
Share of land with fertile soil 0.310 0.350 0.331 0.350 0.248 0.295 0.082 0.002 
Size of land holdings (ha) 1.119 1.857 1.005 1.668 1.468 1.247 -0.463 0.000 
 
  
 
    
 
  
  N 1281   965   316       
Note: Similar to the findings by Deininger et al. (2011), for some of the variables, the mean differences between treatment and control groups of households are 
statistically significant. 
Environment for Development Bezabih and Siba 
23 
Table 3. Decision to Participate in Off-Farm Activities: Random Effect and Mundlak’s Fixed Effect Estimators 
dependent variable: paid off-farm  Random effects  Mundlak's fixed effects**   
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)  
Hh in the certified village(treatment)    -0.8750***  -1.0117***  -0.8740***  -1.0094*** 
     (0.2758)   (0.2956)   (0.2758)   (0.2957)  
Post_certification (treatment*year_2005)  0.8330*   0.9831   0.8394**   0.8783**   0.9567**   0.9858**  
   (0.4898)   (0.6264)   (0.3486)   (0.3498)   (0.4076)   (0.4058)  
Post_certification (treatment*year_2007)        0.2554     0.2525  
         (0.1927)     (0.1927)  
Total land area*post certification    -0.0345       -0.0273   -0.0252  
     (0.0422)       (0.0509)   (0.0499)  
Year effect_2002  1.8589***  1.8554***  1.8253***  1.8267***  1.8218***  1.8234*** 
   (0.3700)   (0.3698)   (0.1248)   (0.1248)   (0.1249)   (0.1249)  
Year effect_2005  0.1790   0.1720   0.2135   0.2236   0.2059   0.2163  
   (0.4171)   (0.4231)   (0.1439)   (0.1440)   (0.1445)   (0.1446)  
Year effect_2007  0.5432**   0.5403**   0.5804***  0.5130***  0.5751***  0.5089*** 
   (0.2300)   (0.2297)   (0.1571)   (0.1656)   (0.1574)   (0.1657)  
Female headed household  -0.3945**   -0.3930**   -0.4070***  -0.4105***  -0.4060***  -0.4096*** 
   (0.1611)   (0.1604)   (0.1268)   (0.1269)   (0.1269)   (0.1269)  
Age of household head  -0.0116***  -0.0116***  -0.0119***  -0.0118***  -0.0119***  -0.0118*** 
   (0.0030)   (0.0030)   (0.0029)   (0.0029)   (0.0029)   (0.0029)  
N male adults in hh  0.0617**   0.0635***  -0.0158   -0.0174   -0.0124   -0.0143  
   (0.0245)   (0.0245)   (0.0861)   (0.0861)   (0.0863)   (0.0864)  
N female adults in hh  0.0952**   0.0954**   0.1513*   0.1519*   0.1525*   0.1530*  
   (0.0401)   (0.0401)   (0.0834)   (0.0834)   (0.0834)   (0.0834)  
N female adults in hh  -0.0173   -0.0172   -0.0373   -0.0346   -0.0370   -0.0344  
   (0.0809)   (0.0809)   (0.0883)   (0.0884)   (0.0883)   (0.0884)  
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Total land area  -0.0026   -0.0002   -0.0006   0.0003   0.0015   0.0023  
   (0.0133)   (0.0151)   (0.0123)   (0.0123)   (0.0129)   (0.0129)  
TLU livestock owned  -0.0258**   -0.0258**   0.0139   0.0139   0.0137   0.0138  
   (0.0121)   (0.0121)   (0.0165)   (0.0165)   (0.0165)   (0.0165)  
Share of plots with fertile soil  0.2433*   0.2431*   0.2096*   0.2031*   0.2103*   0.2038*  
   (0.1376)   (0.1378)   (0.1174)   (0.1177)   (0.1175)   (0.1177)  
Constant   -1.4199***  -1.4220***  -1.3830***  -1.3687***  -1.3825***  -1.3683*** 
   (0.2131)   (0.2123)   (0.2059)   (0.2062)   (0.2059)   (0.2062)  
lnsig2u              
Constant   -11.5467   -11.5478   -11.5437   -11.5417   -11.5449   -11.5429  
   (8846.7480)   (8879.6668)   (13.0603)   (13.0728)   (13.0504)   (13.0633)  
Chamberlain-Mundlak effects NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Kebele fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors clustered at kebele level YES YES NO NO NO NO 
chi2   476.0332   2878.6806   612.0964   613.4011   612.3519   613.6018  
N   5013   5013   5013   5013   5013   5013  
* Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.  
** We have attempted clustering standard errors at a kebele level for four estimators: logit-fixed effects, conditional logit (which is similar to fixed effects logit), 
Mundlak’ fixed effect logit, and random effects logit. The first two failed because we lost around 2062 observations due to lack of variation in the dependent 
variable across the different rounds. For Mundlak’s fixed effect, wild bootstrapping estimation failed, as we got a warning sign indicating that more than 10 
percent of the iterations have failed, along with a suggestion to use a more suitable estimator. Kebele-level clustering for Mundlak’s fixed effect was also a 
problem because the number of variables is greater than the number of clusters and the variance-covariance is not of full rank. The result was that we had a 
missing chi square and p values corresponding to the Wald test. In other words, we cannot test the hypothesis that all the parameters are jointly zero. The only 
instance in which we were able to conduct kebele clustering properly was when we did it for the random effects specification.  
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Table 4. Common Trends Assumption Test 
  MAJOROFF-FARM 
  Chi square p-value 
2000-2002 0.06 0.8049 
2000-2005 0.84 0.3593 
2002-2005 4.45 0.0348 
Note: the test statistics and p-values represent the test of the null hypothesis of no common trend. The tests 
are based on the regression results in Appendix B.  
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Appendix A. Decision to Participate in Off-Farm Activities Based on 
Observations from 2005 and 2007 
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)  
paid_off_farm          
_Itreatment_1     -1.6581***  -1.6671*** 
     (0.3743)   (0.3756)  
Post_certification (treatment*year_2007)  1.6452***  1.6343***    1.6428*** 
   (0.6192)   (0.5913)     (0.2901)  
landarea*post_certification    0.0074     0.0104  
     (0.0304)     (0.0340)  
year_2007   -0.0310   -0.0340   -0.0271   -0.0306  
   (0.4453)   (0.4543)   (0.1351)   (0.1356)  
Female headed household  -0.3888**   -0.3881**   -0.3959**   -0.3947**  
   (0.1708)   (0.1707)   (0.1832)   (0.1832)  
Age of household head  -0.0065   -0.0065   -0.0063   -0.0063  
   (0.0054)   (0.0054)   (0.0039)   (0.0039)  
N male adults in hh  0.0539   0.0534   0.0700   0.0679  
   (0.0423)   (0.0433)   (0.1399)   (0.1400)  
N female adults in hh  0.0999*   0.0994   0.1349   0.1340  
   (0.0599)   (0.0606)   (0.1343)   (0.1344)  
N female adults in hh  -0.2064   -0.2069   -0.2263*   -0.2271*  
   (0.1498)   (0.1502)   (0.1225)   (0.1225)  
Total land area  0.0090   0.0076   0.0093   0.0074  
   (0.0096)   (0.0124)   (0.0153)   (0.0168)  
TLU livestock owned  -0.0859***  -0.0858***  -0.0435   -0.0435  
   (0.0257)   (0.0257)   (0.0351)   (0.0350)  
Share of plots with fertile soil  0.3862**   0.3857**   0.2247   0.2222  
   (0.1921)   (0.1925)   (0.1720)   (0.1722)  
Constant       -1.3760***  -1.3680*** 
       (0.2715)   (0.2727)  
Chamberlain-Mundlak effects YES YES YES YES 
Kebele fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
chi2   185.6089   209.8284   209.8607   209.7480  
N   2862   2862   2862   2862  
 * Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. 
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Appendix B. Chamberlain-Mundlak Pseudo Treatment Regression Results 
   (1)   (2)   (3)  
PAID OFF-FARM       
Hh in the certified village(treatment)  -2.8841***  -0.9729***  -1.4388*  
   (0.7318)   (0.3037)   (0.7857)  
Treated, year 2000  0.6949**   -0.4598**    
   (0.2925)   (0.1839)    
Control, year 2000  -0.7504***  0.1263    
   (0.1710)   (0.1189)    
Treated, year 2002  2.6944***    1.9995*** 
   (0.2620)     (0.2345)  
Control, year 2002  1.1009***    1.8513*** 
   (0.1433)     (0.1523)  
Treated, year 2005    -0.1012   -0.6949**  
     (0.1812)   (0.2925)  
Control, year 2005    -0.3909***  0.7504*** 
     (0.1225)   (0.1710)  
Female headed household  -0.4460***  -0.3991***  -0.4460*** 
   (0.1569)   (0.1163)   (0.1569)  
Age of household head  -0.0189***  -0.0188***  -0.0189*** 
   (0.0038)   (0.0028)   (0.0038)  
N male adults in hh  -0.0100   0.0784   -0.0100  
   (0.1077)   (0.0850)   (0.1077)  
N female adults in hh  0.1845*   0.0279   0.1845*  
   (0.1068)   (0.0820)   (0.1068)  
N female adults in hh  0.1088   -0.0440   0.1088  
   (0.1083)   (0.0832)   (0.1083)  
Total land area  0.0009   -0.0092   0.0009  
   (0.0143)   (0.0123)   (0.0143)  
TLU livestock owned  0.0236   0.0271*   0.0236  
   (0.0185)   (0.0160)   (0.0185)  
Share of plots with fertile soil  0.0233   0.4242***  0.0233  
   -0.5988**   1.1398***  -1.3492*** 
Chamberlain-Mundlak effects YES YES YES 
Kebele fixed effects YES YES YES 
   (0.2449)   (0.1935)   (0.2445)  
chi2   546.2864   388.7513   546.2864  
N   3484   3584   3484  
* Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. 
